khoji parkWar · Afghanistan · 2001
The Capital Fell Quickly. The War Did Not.
A rapid campaign removed the Taliban government without settling the conflict.
Read in slides1. The attacks lead to an ultimatum
After the September 11 attacks, the United States demanded that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda and hand over its leaders. Afghanistan had already endured decades of war, and the Taliban controlled most, but not all, of the country. The confrontation placed that existing civil conflict inside a new international campaign directed at the group responsible for the attacks.
A war already underway in Afghanistan was about to acquire a powerful new participant.
2. The air campaign begins
On 7 October 2001, US and British forces began strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets. The operation combined aircraft, intelligence and small teams on the ground rather than beginning with a large conventional invasion force advancing along one front. Afghan opposition groups were central partners, bringing local knowledge, fighters and their own political objectives to the campaign.
The foreign forces supplied overwhelming airpower; they still needed allies on the ground.
3. Existing enemies become partners
US personnel worked with the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces. Some teams travelled on horseback in difficult terrain while directing air support. That striking image became famous, but the campaign was not simply modern technology meeting an unchanged ancient battlefield. Afghan commanders had years of experience, local networks and rivalries that would matter after the Taliban’s military position weakened.
The partners agreed on an enemy more easily than on the country that should follow.
4. The cities change hands
In November, opposition forces took Mazar-e-Sharif, and the Taliban then abandoned Kabul. Other major positions fell, including Kandahar in December. The speed of the government’s collapse encouraged the impression of a short and decisive campaign. Losing control of cities, however, did not mean every fighter had surrendered, every leader had been captured or the political roots of the conflict had disappeared.
The government could fall faster than the insurgency behind it could be eliminated.
5. The search does not catch everyone
Operations pursued al-Qaeda members in eastern Afghanistan, including at Tora Bora. Osama bin Laden escaped the 2001 campaign and was not killed until 2011 in Pakistan. That gap is important to the story of the invasion’s initial objectives. Removing the government that hosted al-Qaeda and capturing its leader were related aims, but success in one did not establish success in the other.
The capital was no longer Taliban-held, while the most wanted target remained at large.
6. A political settlement begins without everyone
The Bonn process established an interim arrangement led by Hamid Karzai. International assistance and military commitments expanded as institutions were rebuilt. The Taliban were excluded from the talks, and disagreements among Afghan factions persisted. Military success had created an opening for a new political order, but it had not supplied agreement, durable security or a ready-made administration across the whole country.
Winning the opening campaign left the harder question of how to govern afterward.
7. The opening is mistaken for an ending
The conflict continued for two decades, bringing enormous civilian harm, displacement and losses among Afghan and international forces. In 2021, the Taliban returned to power as the US-led presence ended. This story focuses on 2001, when a fast collapse of the Taliban government could be mistaken for a settled outcome. The later history showed how different those two achievements were.
Taking a capital was an event. Ending the war was a different task.